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Abstract 
The WWW increasingly allows people to create and update content for public access. Some of 
this information is collaboratively owned (created and maintained), while other information is privately 
owned and maintained (but still publicly accessible). Whereas it is unethical to modify the former for 
covert communication, it is quite legitimate to do so with the latter, and this paper gives a design for 
doing so while achieving both plausible deniability and automatic perishability of the covert message 
(the message disappears unless periodically refreshed by the encoder). Traditional information-hiding 
has looked at the problem of embedding a message in a static version of an online document, the problem 
of doing so for rapidly evolving document collections has not been considered in the past. This paper 
shows that it is possible to do so, and in a manner that actually makes use of the rapidly evolving nature 
of the documents to achieve the above-mentioned property of evanescence: That the message decays 
over time and eventually becomes completely erased unless it is refreshed. Therefore the mark needs 
to be continuously maintained as the document evolves, in a manner that prevents the adversary from 
knowing who is doing the refreshing yet that allows the intended reader of the mark to recover it without 
any form of explicit communication. One advantage of our scheme is that the mark's reach is now 
unbounded: It can be read by any authorized entity on the web (anyone with the secret key), and the 
reading of it is indistinguishable from normal web access patterns. Another advantage is the "hiding 
in the crowd" effect: Many people are updating the documents, thereby providing a cover for the one 
person surreptitiously injecting and refreshing the mark, or replacing it with another mark message. We 
have also demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed technique, and shown that remarkably little effort 
is required to implement our scheme over today's web. 
"Portions of this work were supported by Grants IIS- 0325345, IIS-0219560, IIS-0312357, and IIS-0242421 from the National 
Science Foundation, and by sponsors of the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security. 
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Although messages that self-destruct were featured in spy movies, their potential usefulness is not limited 
to the original purpose of their self-destruction in such movies, which was to prevent their being read by 
a hostile adversary after they had served their useful purpose of communicating the next mission to Mr 
Phelps. The case for making such messages perishable includes many possible reasons: (i) Such messages 
can become stale and thereby convey misleading information to their intended recipient (e.g., the message 
"Alice and Bob are both doing fine" after one of them ceases to be doing fine) - more generally, because 
information is perishable and becomes stale, useless, or even dangerous as the world changes, it stands to 
reason that stealthy messages that convey that information should be similarly perishable and self-efface; (ii) 
if the message involves a secret key, then the longer it lingers, the more it is likely that it (and the key used to 
hide it) may eventually be compromised by an adversary who has enough computational resources (or will 
have such resources in the future - systems have to be resilient not only against the computational power 
of today but also against that of the future); (iii) the desired updating of the message (either refreshing it or 
replacing it with another message) by the person who wrote it may become infeasible through that person's 
accidental loss of the secret key, loss of access to the online world, or other physical inability to take such 
action; (iv) the automatic disappearance of the message can be used to communicate the very fact that (iii) 
has occurred; (v) the person in charge of removing the message may be negligent, or may erroneously 
believe that someone else was supposed to do the removal, etc. 
Providing privacy preserving Web-based communication is an active research area [2 ,7,  151. Achieving 
this is hard because many players (such as authoritarian governments, aggressive marketers, etc) want to 
have a complete profile of Web users and a log of their actions on the Web. We propose a private communi- 
cation channel, that ensures plausible deniability, and automatic perishability of the messages. We achieve 
this goal through the use of collaborative web content available on the Internet, without unethically inter- 
fering with the functionality of these valuable services, and without any need for modification of publicly 
available data (defined as data not owned by the sender of the message). In a nutshell, our scheme is based 
on pairing a privately owned web page with a collaboratively owned web page, and to use this pair as a cover 
document. The embedding changes are only performed on the privately owned web page. A more detailed 
summary of this scheme is given in Section 3. 
There are many challenges involved in designing such a system: 
how to use, for marking purposes, the content that we cannot modify either because we have no 
control over it (e.g., news portals), or because it is unethical to use the ability to modify it for marking 
purposes (e.g., wikis, forums) 
heterogeneous content; most published marking schemes assume one type of content, whereas we 
are now faced with a semi-structured collection of different content types (text, images, audio, video, 
annotations, etc) 
not interfering with the proper functioning of the publicly owned covers used 
providing controlled perishability 
being stealthy while using a publicly accessible cover document (as is customarily required in infor- 
mation hiding) 
providing plausible deniability of the covert communication 
providing high covert communication bandwidth (especially challenging when the document consists 














The difficulty of these challenges is exacerbated by the increasing power that a potential adversary can 
muster - the repertoire of information sources for such an adversary now includes forum or blog boards 
(most or least accessed pages, most active member etc.), web-bots, ISP logs, search engines, web page 
tracking engines[9,6], to mention a few. 
Our system fulfills most of the requirements listed for a Web based publishing system listed by Wald- 
man et al. [15]: censorship-resistant, tamper evident, source anonymous, updatable, deniable, fault tolerant, 
persistent (i.e., no expiration date), extensible, freely available. As will become clear later, the only require- 
ment we do not provide is persistency over time (which is inherently incompatible with a self-destructing 
message). 
Previously proposed private communication systems use a third party distributor (e.g., e-mail services [2]) 
to store and distribute the message to intended receivers. In our system, the sender does not use a third party 
distributor and therefore has a greater degree of control. The sender also has the option of privately storing 
the cover document (until it is cached by another Internet company [ l  1, 81) if shehe wishes to maintain the 
privately owned web page that is used as part of the cover document. 
Refer to Section 5 for more information about available systems. 
In Section 2, we introduce the model of Web content used in the communication channel described in 
this paper. The system overview is provided in Section 3. The experimental framework and results are 
discussed in Section 4. 
2 Document Models 
Before going into the details, we give a brief overview of how our system works. In what follows, by 
referring to something as "secret" we mean that knowing it requires the key that is shared by the encoder 
and decoder of the message. 
Perishability is achieved by a secret pairing of every encoder-controlled document (say, d) with a doc- 
ument p(d) that is outside of the encoder's control; we consider a document to be outside the encoder's 
control if it is unethical or against the accepted etiquette for the encoder to use it for stealthy communication 
(so although a user may, for example, physically be capable of modifying collaborative content, it would 
be inappropriate to modify such content for the purpose of encoding). A document d that is within the 
encoder's control contains elements that we refer to as e l ,  . . . , el,; if d contains too many elements for us to 
use, then we choose only a number l d  of them (less than the total available). What determines an ei7s role 
(e.g., pair-selection, mark-encoding, etc) is the keyed hash of it, denoted as H(ei) .  Some types of elements 
ei have a payload, e.g., for a mark-encoding ei the payload consists of the mark's bits that it encodes. Let el 
be to p(d) what ei is to d (actually there is more to e!, than that, but we defer this discussion to the section 3.2 
on implementation details). If ei has a payload, then that payload is determined by the keyed hash of the 
concatenation of ei with with el: H(ei,  el). A change in enough of the elements of p(d)'s will, over time, 
erase the message. See Figure 1. 
Encodability is achieved through the latitude we have to modify the individual ei's so they encode both 
their intended functionality and (if applicable) their appropriate payloads. This latitude includes, for rich 
content, a simple selection and re-ordering of content types, that typically can achieve 22 bits of encoding 
even without any modification to any of these rich types (see Section 2.1.1 for more details on this). If subset 
selection and ordering information for rich types is not enough, or not feasible because some sites disallow 
rich content or enforce rigid templates for it, then we resort to modification of the ei's actual contents rather 
then their presence and sequence order: We modify some pixels of an image [4], replace words by synonyms 
using robust synonym substitution [14], judiciously inject typos [12] in domains where they are common 
enough (blogs, newsgroups), etc. We will later discuss desirable properties for p(d). 
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Figure 1 : Pairing the elements of privately owned web page with the collaboratively updated web page for 
information hiding. 
domains we can choose and modify the ei's dynamically so as to maintain the desired pairing and encoding 
properties. But in append-only domains (e.g., forum posts, opinion pieces, etc) no modifications are allowed 
of the old versions of content: In these, we achieve the net effect of modifying a now-obsolete ei roughly as 
follows. We append a new element e to d, making sure that H(e)  encodes for e the exact same functionality 
as ei, thereby signaling to the decoder that the chronologically prior ei is to be ignored and e used in its stead. 
That is, if successive hashes of all the e j  's of a particular d give more than one of the same functionality as 
another, the decoder always breaks the tie in favor of the more recent one. 
As stated earlier, what constitutes the sequence of ei elements is the chronological sequence of (possibly 
append-only, possibly update-able) posts, comments, essays, etc; so the next item posted would be any one 
of these logical units, let's call it ei. Even in the most constrained case for us, when the ei do not have rich 
content (e.g., only text and tags) we were always able to make that ei (and, if applicable, its concatenation 
with p ( d ) )  hash into what we want; in some sense, we "torture ei until it confesses". In rare cases we resort 
to typos, but these are very common (almost expected) in such text-only informal material. 
There might be cases (relatively rare) where the append operations have no provision for a chronological 
date and time cannot be handled as above; this occurs if, for example, free-flowing text is added without any 
information about which paragraph was added on which day (so that the web site shows only the current 
snapshot of the document). In that case we use a fixed number of items as our definition of what constitutes 
the next ei,  e.g., it could be the next k basic items from the available categories, where a basic item is a 
paragraph, or an image, etc. (so the next ei could consist of the next k paragraphs of texts that we append, if 
only text is added). A too small value for k runs the risk of not being able to carry out enough modifications 























2.1 Embedding Channels 
As mentioned above, an ei has an encoding capacity through making changes to it that modify H(e i )  and 
(if it is used) H(ei ,  eb). We now briefly review what kinds of changes to ei are made. This depends on the 
domain, specifically whether it allows free-format rich content or not. We begin with the former. 
2.1.1 Rich Content 
Wikis are a popular way for collaborative content creation, which allow rich content creation. Inside a wilu 
website usually users can both modify the existing content of individual pages, and add new pages. The 
collective review and editing through such liberal content modification allows wiki sites to produce quality 
documents. 
A rich content creation web site may offer a wide range of element types to contribute content: 
text in different styles 








tags or categories 
In high quality wikis there are style guides that sketch the general good editing practices. Clearly a wiki 
page that consists of several types of content can be typeset in a variety of ways while complying with the 
respective style guidelines. A good wiki page can consist of one of the more than 222 different ordered 
permutations of the 10 types of content that were listed above. The 22 bits that were encoded while staying 
strictly within quality standards of the wiki can be used as a covert channel. 
Another popular way of rich content creation is blogs. The blogs can be hosted by a large collection 
web site like wiki pages, but unlike wiki pages blogs are usually not strictly monitored for their content and 
style. Moreover individual blogs are usually under the control of one user. 
This kind of content creation web sites provide an extra latitude for covert communication, since it is 
possible to communicate 22 bits of information just through the use of simple selection and re-ordering of 
content types even without any modification to any of these rich types. 
2.1.2 Restricted Content 
Some online content creation sites offer only one or a very limited number of different content types of 
contribution: 
tags (product tags) 
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links (related links, bookmarks) 
These sites are usually in the form of collections, and they restrict the users to appending new content and do 
not allow modification of existing content. Examples of these include online forums, newsgroups, product 
reviews, and product tags. History pages (pages that list the log of modifications on a page) of individual 
pages in rich content web sites (e.g. wikis) also exhibit an append-only characteristic, since older snapshots 
of the pages are fixed, and these history pages monotonically grow in size as new changes are made to the 
respective documents. 
The append-only characteristic of these sites constitute an interesting challenge for covert communica- 
tion. In Section 3 we explore this model further and give an algorithm for encoding and decoding using a 
covert channel based on it. 
3 System Overview 
The system consists of an algorithm that determines which of a document's n links are relevant to the mark 
and how they encode their relevant bit(s) of the mark (e.g. links could be different personal pages in a 
community web site). In our implementation, each message bit is encoded in a pair of key-selected links, 
only one of which is controlled by the message encoder: This pairing is necessary for the simultaneous 
achievement of the desired properties of encodability and perishability (self-effacing mark). Encoding a 
mark's bit using only a link under the control of the encoder would not achieve the desired perishability 
property, whence this "mixing" of what is under the encoder's control with a sibling that is beyond such 
control. Moreover, the rate of the perishability (does the mark vanish in days, or in weeks?) can be controlled 
by selecting a sibling that is rapidly changing (for faster decay) or slow changing (for slower decay). See 
Section 3.2 for further discussion on controlling the speed of message decay. 
For the sake of definiteness we describe the algorithm for B bits per pair. 
In this section, we will use the append-only content creation model to describe our system. However it is 
possible to generalize it tofree-jorm modiJication, where the contributors are allowed to delete and modify 
existing content (see Section 3.4). 
The algorithm takes as input (i) a document that has a set of n links (call this set U), m of which are in 
D and are designated (as being under the encoder's control), m 5 n/2; (ii) a keyed hash function H; and 
(iii) a r-bit mark message w = bl . . . b,. Each link points to a document d with el, elements (their tags, 
content or combination thereof). The algorithm outputs a judicious modification of the documents pointed 
to by designated links, such that a pairing operation using H only results in m pairs of selected links: One 
link of each pair is a designated link from our set, the other is its sibling, p ( d ) ,  chosen from one of the n - m 
non-designated links. A decoder who has H but does not know the designated links can find out the same 
pairing, by applying H to all links in the document. The process of producing these pairs by the encoder 
takes place as follows (keep in mind that the pairing has to be producible by the decoder as well, who has 
the keyed hash function but otherwise has no a priori knowledge of which links are designated and which 
are not): 
1. All of the designated links are made to acquire new elements from categories SELECTION, PAIR- 
ING, EMBEDDING and CANCEL according to their roles. The categorization of elements can be 
achieved by partitioning the 2 most significant bits of the hash values of the elements, e.g. 00 for 
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In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we use a concatenation of the least significant bits of ele- 
ments from the same type to generate larger bit strings. In practice we use more sophisticated infor- 
mation hiding methods to embed larger amounts of information into one element (e.g., image, audio, 
video [4], text [13, 121). 
2. The subset T of IT1 = T / B  links out of D are marked by adding new SELECTION elements (until 
the probability that a non-designated link contains more SELECTION elements before the message 
decays is within acceptable limits). These new SELECTION elements signal the selected subset of 
links in U that encode the message to a decoder that only has the information of H. Let the set of 
non-selected links be F = U - T .  
3. We modify PAIRING elements of each link 1 in T ,  and select a sibling for 1 from non designated links 
with the bit string they generate (i.e., by using the concatenation of the least significant bits of their 
hash value as a pointer or id). If a link in T is involved in a collision between its choice of sibling 
and the choice made by another link in T ,  we change some of the PAIRING elements until collision 
disappears and another desired sibling is selected. 
4. The sorted order of the hash of concatenation of the SELECTION elements of links in T also provides 
a way of knowing which ones will encode which bits: The smallest in the sorted order will encode the 
first B bits of the mark, the second will encode the next B bits, etc, until all B x IT1 bits of the mark 
are encoded (we consider the redundancy and error correction as being included in these B x IT( bits). 
5. Go through each selected link in T according to the above-mentioned sorted order. For each of them 
do the following: add a set of EMBEDDING elements to the link so that the concatenation of the least 
significant bits of H(ei ,  el) (i.e., hash of an EMBEDDING element ei and a counterpart element e: of 
sibling) is equal to the B bits of the mark that it seeks to encode. 
6. Later, if the sibling of a link 1 of T unexpectedly turns out to have the wrong mean-time-between- 
modifications characteristics (too small for a desired slow decay, or too large for a desired fast decay 
due to changes in public interest to the sibling document), then there are two options: i) the hash of 
the PAIRING elements are modified by appending new PAIRING elements such that their hash, as 
a seed, selects a suitable item from F (one that has the desired characteristic). Of course this has 
to be done subject to not creating a collision with the choice of another link in T .  ii) if reusing 1 to 
accommodate a new pairing will cause exceeding a stealthiness threshold for its number of elements, 
1 is de-selected using CANCEL elements. A new designated link can be selected to replace its place 
in encoding the bits of the message using the same SELECTION tags of 1 if desired. 
The decoder operation consists of the following steps: 
1. Compute T and F using the secret key and H, and then compute the sibling information (i.e pairing) 
p(d) for each d in T .  
2. Sort the documents in T according to the hash of their SELECTION elements. 
3. Use the sorted order to read from each of the selected documents B bits that it encodes jointly with 
its sibling by computing H(ei ,  el) for each EMBEDDING element. 
SELECTION determines which of the given n links are used for encoding. PAIRING determines which 
one of the non-designated documents is paired with each document selected by SELECTION process. EM- 
BEDDING determines the encoded message bit string by the selected link and its pair. CANCELING is 





























3.1 How the Mark Decays 
Note the following characteristic of our system: Extensive changes to a non-designated link does not do 
more damage to the mark than more modest changes to that same link. Rather, the damage occurs from 
modifications done to many links (even if each of these modifications is modest) that, over time, eventu- 
ally overwhelm the built-in redundancy and error-correction (which are needed for a practical operational 
consideration discussed below). The primary mechanism we use for controlling the lifetime of the mark 
(when it is not refreshed) is therefore not the amount of the redundancy and error-correction we introduce, 
but rather our choice of the characteristics of the sibling links - the frequency with which they are likely to 
be updated based on past observations of their behavior. What if that previously observed behavior changes 
against our expectation, e.g., a link that was rapidly changing when we selected it as sibling becomes largely 
dormant after a period of time. To avoid this damaging the perishability property of our mark, we refresh the 
mark so that a new sibling gets selected instead (one with a more appropriate mean-time-between-updates 
value). 
3.2 Controlling the pace of perishability 
It is quite likely that we may not find public documents that undergo changes at exactly the rate we need to 
achieve our targeted pace of perishability. This subsection discusses how we overcome a possible mismatch 
between our needs and what is available. We use two basic techniques: A slowdown technique for the case 
where the paired documents are too fast-changing for our needs, and a speedup technique for the opposite 
case where the paired documents are too slow-changing for our needs. We now discuss each of these in turn. 
We made the assumption that changes to paired non-designated pages will localize at element level (e.g., 
a paragraph of text). This assumption is supported by analysis of Buriol et. al. [ I]  that the amount of changes 
to a page in Wikipedia have stayed roughly the same throughout the Wikipedia history at the level of one 
short paragraph at a time. 
3.2.1 The slowdown technique 
We temporarily assume that the number of embedding elements of d  is no greater than lp (d)  (the number of 
elements in p ( d ) ) ;  although this is a reasonable assumption in view of the fact that public documents tend 
to be larger than private ones (e.g., Wikipedia grows over time, whereas a student's web page tends to stay 
relatively small), we will later on discuss how to avoid this assumption. 
Each of the (say, t) embedding eis of d  will be paired with the concatenation of one or more elements 
of p ( d ) ,  and it is this concatenation that we called e: in the previous sections. The number of elements (call 
it A) of p ( d )  that make up one e;, is determined by the desired slowdown factor s, by t, and also by the total 
number of elements l P ( d )  in p ( d ) .  Specifically we choose 
By way of example, assume the number of embedding eis in d  is t = 5. Suppose we have a p ( d )  that 
changes 10 times faster than we like, and that it consists of (say) lp (d)  = 50 elements (e.g., paragraphs). In 
that case we need a A of 
Using the keyed hash function of the 5 embedding ei's in d,  we select for each ei a single element of 
p ( d )  to act as its e:. As only 5 of the 50 elements of p ( d )  impact the embedded message, the probability that 
a change in p ( d )  causes damage to the message is only 0.1. Notice that the use of the keyed hash function to 
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select the eis has the effect that, irrespective of the likelihood of change in the 50 elements of p(d) (e.g., even 
if that distribution is nonuniform), the probability that a change in an element of p(d) impacts our embedded 
message is now 0.1, i.e., we have achieved the desired slowdown of a factor of 10 not only through the 
judicious selection of A, but crucially through the randomization done by the use of the keyed hash. 
3.2.2 The speedup technique 
Suppose that in the previous sections, instead of H(e l ,  e;) . . . H(e t ,  ei) being used as the encoding mecha- 
nism for the pair d,p(d),  it was the following: 
Although this would not change the probability that a modification in one of the elements of p(d) will 
damage the mark, it does amplify t-fold the number of mark bits damaged in that case. This is indeed one 
mechanism for achieving a speedup of the decay. 
The speedup can be further enhanced by increasing the size of the portion of p(d) that can affect the 
mark until in eventually includes all lp (d )  elements of p(d). 
The above mechanism is probably enough in many situations, but it could be the case that an even faster 
decay is needed than what can be achieved by the above damage-amplification process. In that case we 
resort to the following method. We use a one-to-many mapping for the pairing function p(.), i.e., p(d) is no 
longer a single document but a concatenation of multiple documents. In fact this method can even be used in 
the slowdown technique in case the assumption o f t  < lp (d )  does not hold: It can be forced to hold by using 
a large enough multiplicity for the p(.) function (although as we stated above, this will occur very rarely). 
3.3 System Operation Issues 
A burst of updates could be done to many nodes not under the control of the encoder, just prior to a read 
attempt by the decoder and before the encoder has a chance to react to the change and refresh the mark. 
Although redundancy and error-correction can mitigate the effects of this (i.e., the mark can survive), it is 
possible that the sudden updates are so extensive as to overwhelm the mark. What happens in such a case 
? The reader (i) recovers the wrong mark, that he is therefore unable to decrypt into something that makes 
sense (it decrypts to random gibberish); then (ii) the reader backs off from the read attempt and tries to read 
again at a later time. We believe this to be preferable to a solution that involves a rendez-vous time between 
the encoder and the decoder (e.g., one refreshes at 4:55PM and the other reads at 4:57PM), which would be 
awkward and unnecessarily constrain the system's operation. Such a rendez-vous mechanism has its uses, 
however, if one wants to deliberately create an evanescent mark, which is a mark that fleetingly appears then 
is promptly read and erased immediately thereafter by the encoder. Such a rendez-vous mechanism also 
increases the communication bandwidth because the encoder relies on fleeting changes that will not have 
to stand up to the scrutiny of the other readers of the public information forum being used (the "problem" 
introduced in encoding gets fixed relatively fast, before the complaints roll in). 
3.4 The Case of Free-Form Modification 
Recall that this is when we are not constrained to operate in append-only mode when modifying d, i.e., we 
can modify the individual ei's so as to cany out the modifications we seek. 
Recall that the functionality of an ei is governed by the two most significant bits of H(ei),  whereas its 
payload is governed by the !least significant bits of H (ei,p(d)) wherep(d) is the sibling of d and ! depends 
on the functionality (e.g., if ei encodes 20 bits of the mark then ! = 20). We distinguish two cases. 
~
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The first case is when the update is not supposed to change the functionality of an ei, only its payload. 
This is the most frequent update and happens when, e.g., we still want ei's functionality to be an encoding 
one, but we want to change ei so that the e least significant bits of H(ei ,  e:) are restored to their original 
value, which they now deviate from because of a modification that occurred to p(d). Recall that such changes 
that occur to p(d) are beyond the encoder's control - the encoder merely responds to them by modifying ei 
so as to restore the correct value to the e least significant bits of H(ei,  e!,). The encoder will, on average, 
need to apply 22+e modifications to ei before he manages to give their target value to the 2 f e bits that 
he is trying to control. The encoder achieves that capacity by a multiplicity of methods. One of these 
involves trying different subsets of rich content types for inclusion in the new ei, and for each subset trying 
all possible orderings of these types. This usually gives the power to carry out the job, without the need to 
apply different modifications to these types. Specifically, if there are x types, then the number of different 
orderings of all their different subsets is 
5 ! / ( x  - i)! 
For typical rich content, the log2 of the above gives 22.5, hence an encoding capacity of around 22 
bits, making possible an e = 20 without the need to modify each individual type when refreshing the mark 
(capacity can be much increased if we are willing to make such changes to text, images, etc). 
We have implemented our system to work as a plugin through a browser based interface, where the user 
is provided with a Javascript based code that can be run by cliclung on a bookmark in the toolbar (See the 
bookmark labeled as "WaneMark" in the screen shot shown in Figure 2). When the bookmark is clicked a 
text area is dynamically created inside the browser window. The user enters the secret key, the paired URL 
(In the current implementation this is just a label of a Wikipedia page.), and a secret message. Encoding 
is performed in three steps. At every step user highlights a part of the text in the text preview window, 
and hits the 'Try Encode" button. WaneMark modifies the highlighted text. The current system leaves the 
trailing piece of the highlighted text that does not contribute to the encoding intact; the remaining portion 
can be used for encoding other parts of the message. The user approves the changes by hitting the "Accept 
Changes" button and proceeds to the next step. 
See Figure 2 for a screen shot of the current system operating on a third party blogging interface. [More 
detailed information about our experiments will be provided in the camera ready copy of our paper including 
the traffic analysis of dynamically changing pages. We can characterize the updates to non-designated links 
by their mean-time-between-updates.]. 
A demo of our implemented system is available at 
http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/utopkara~wanemark. 
Note that WaneMark can use different steganography algorithms as plugins. In our proof-of-concept 
implementation, we have used a typographical-error based information hiding technique that mimics errors 
of a human for modifying the text elements on web pages [12]. However, there are many other methods 
available for performing the same task [14, 13,3, 10, 17, 161. Non-text elements can be used for information 
carrying using image, audio and video steganography techniques available in the literature [4]. 
The current implementation is a bookmarklet, and does not have permissions to operate on sites other 
than the test site. 
We use 16-bit labels to mark SELECTION, PAIRING and EMBEDDING elements. 
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Figure 2: Screen shot of the WaneMark system operating on a test interface. Each paragraph helps carrying 
16 bits for SELECTION, PAIRING and EMBEDDING. 
5 Related Work 
Our system aims to mitigate the problem of establishing a truly private web based communication channel. 
As also mentioned by Butler et al., users of web based communication services have the right to expect that 
their messages will only be read by the intended recipients, and should be guaranteed of their privacy [2]. 
As a solution, they propose a scheme that uses several communication channels (different online e-mail 
services) simultaneously to deliver a steganographically marked text message that carries the secret message 
embedded in it and the cryptographic keys that are required to decode and decipher the message. Similarly, 
a form of private communication can be provided by the use of secure email tools such as Privacy Enhanced 
Mail (PEM), Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [5].  
But none of these tools can hide the fact that there is a communication going on between the sender and the 
receiver. 
Waldman et al. [15] listed the required properties of a Web based publishing system as follows: censorship- 
resistant, tamper evident, source anonymous, updatable, deniable, fault tolerant, persistent (i.e. no expiration 
date), extensible, freely available. In the same paper, they introduce Publius, a web based publishing system 
that provides these requirements. Publius spreads the data of an anonymous publisher to several servers, 
such as each server receives an encrypted Publius content (some random looking data) and one of the key 
shares that was generated by splitting the publisher's key, K, into several keys. Any k of n key shares can 
reproduce the original K. The publishing process produces a special URL that is used to recover the data 
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and the shares. To browse content, a retriever must get the encrypted Publius content from some server and 
k of the key shares. Any modification to the encrypted content or the special URL, that is cryptographi- 
cally tied to the content, will make it impossible to retrieve the unencrypted data. Publius also provides a 
mechanism for the publishers to update or delete their content. Unlike Publius, where the persistence of the 
messages and reaching to public are driving goals, our system is based on the design goal of perishability of 
the messages, and providing a secure communication only with the intended recipient of the message. 
Readers are referred to [7] for a survey of privacy enhancing technologies for the Internet. 
6 Future Work 
There is room for wringing some inefficiencies out of our scheme. We briefly discuss some of these below. 
In the append-only mode, we need to design a finer granularity of modifications for the ei that have 
an encoding functionality. The difficulty is that, if we were to do so in the natural way (by spreading the 
encoding task of ei into a number of smaller elements) then we need a mechanism for specifying which one 
of the smaller elements (and possibly even which specific bit in it) we are modifying. This "random access" 
feature achieves a substantial saving only if the number of bits encoded is large enough. It also complicates 
implementation. 
In the case of free-flowing text without chronological time-stamp information, the choice of k (how 
many basic units form an ei) can be made more flexible and dependent on the nature of the basic units 
appended rather than their number. This would recognize the fact that some items (like images) have larger 
potential for modification than others (like tags or text). One could assign a set of weights to each such type 
and I% would be the threshold accumulated weight at which an ei is considered to have been created. In such 
a scheme an image could, literally, be worth a thousand words. 
7 Conclusion 
Steganograpy has a long and distinguished history, dating back to five centuries BC. It is useful whenever 
the very existence of the secret message is to remain hidden, as in authoritarian countries that severely limit 
and censor speech. This paper describes a keyed scheme for posting secret messages on the web such that 
anyone with the secret key can retrieve the messages, but even a computationally powerful adversary (e.g., 
a government with supercomputers) who does not have the key is not able to know (let alone prove) the 
message's existence: The message depends on web-wide content, not only on what is under the sender's 
control. If the sender is prevented from erasing the message, the actions of others on the web automatically 
take care of doing the erasing job on the sender's behalf. Moreover, the sender can control, a priori, the 
likely life of the secret message before it automatically disappears, by a judicious design of the "pairing" 
function with the web's sibling information. 
Our scheme is primarily destined for thwarting censorship. There have been many rumors, none substan- 
tiated, of evil-doers using steganography for communication - investigations in that direction have turned 
up no evidence of this. This is probably because evil entities like organized crime (including drug cartels 
and terror networks) have other and more effective ways of communicating, ways that are not available to 
an isolated individual, with limited resources, living in a repressive country. 
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